

## DE VENTRE INSPICIENDO:

*several cases have cited out of the Civil & Canon law  
OR,  
17*

## REMARKS

ON

## Mr. ASHTON's ANSWERER

In a LETTER to a Friend.

Dear SIR,

In Compliance with your Commands, obliging me to give you my Thoughts upon what the Answerer of Mr. Ashton's Speech has said in Relation to the Civil and Common Laws, which he has been pleas'd to produce (as he thinks, conducing to his purpose) you receive this. You very well observe that this Answer has prevailed with many (especially those whose Education has not enabled them to examine his Quotations) to entertain Opinions that we were very hardly dealt with, as to the Affair of the Prince of Wales, contrary both to the *Laws of Nations, Civil and Old Common Law of England*. All that I have to alledg in the matter, is, that the Civil Law never made Provision in such a Case as the Prince of Wales happens to be; because unreasonable, as I shall demonstrate in this following Letter: And as for his Old Common Law, I'll appeal to all the unprejudic'd Worl'd, if it reaches the business he brought it in for. His Laws of Nations I shall not concern myself in, both as 'tis not injoin'd me by you, and likewise because 'tis too abstruse; but it will be I think, sufficient for me to prove, he prevaricates with the Laws (I mean Civil and Common) which the generality of our English World are better acquainted with, and so leave you to judge of the sincerity of the Person: For 'till he convinces me that it is a Law of Nations for every Prince to prove (when the next presumed Heir does or does not demand it) That the Child, he is satisfied, was Born of his Wife, be truly so; though such a thing might happen when she was perhaps at Prayers in her Closet, &c. I say, till he proves this to be usual amongst all Nations; For as Justinian (who I think, understood the Law of Nations as well as this Gentleman) Instit. lib. 1. Tit. 2. Sect. 1. defines the Laws of Nations to be, it is, *Quo jure omnes Gentes utuntur*, I believe I may very well forbear any thing of that matter. It will not be unnecessary, if I hint that the freedom I use is caused chiefly by the Security a private Letter ought to carry with it, which I suppose, will sufficiently admonish you of the Caution and Circumspection you are to use in Exposing it.

First then, he Asserts that the Civil Law upon any Occasion of Suspicion (observe the word of Latitude, ANY OCCASION, &c.) Did Order that Notice be given twice a Week to the Parties concerned;

concerned; that they may receive full satisfaction; that the Mother is to be kept in an House by it self, &c. As in the Answer to the Speech; and all this upon any Occasion of Suspicion. In Answer to which, I reply, what the Civil Law mentions in Relation to Spurious Issues, or Supposititious Births, may be reduced to a very narrow Compass, without leaving any thing material unsaid. *The Sanatus Consultum Plancianum* ( of which Digest. Lib. 25. Tit. 3. de. Agnoscendis & Alendis Liberis ) contains two Cases; of which the first Commands that a Woman Divorced from her Husband, shall within thirty days after this Divorce give Notice to her Husband, if she be with Child, that he may take care of, and make provision for it; or that the Husband deny the Wife to be so with Child by him; which if he does not do, he is obliged to take care of, and Educate the Child that shall be Born of her. The second is, That those Women who after a Divorce, feign a false Birth, render themselves Obnoxious and Punishable; as the Law in such Cases has provided: Of which see Cod. Lib. 9. Tit. 22. *Ad Legem Corneliam de falsis.* Which was then Capital, but was afterwards moderated by the Emperor Leo. Novel. 77.

But in the Time of *Marcus Antoninus* and *Verus* Emperors, there happen'd two New Cases; and by consequence, requir'd a new Remedy; the first was of a Woman Divorced from her Husband, who denied she was big with Child by him; the Husband Asserted she was: upon which ( the Man earnestly desiring an Heir to his Family ) the Emperors wrote to *Valerius Priscianus* the *Prætor* of the City, *That it seem'd most fit to them upon the Husband's Request, that three Midwives should be sent to this Woman and inspect her Body, &c.* Of which Digest. 25. Tit. 4. *Ventre inspicio.* The other Case was, of a Woman, who after the Death of her Husband affirm'd her self with Child; upon which the *Prætor* Commanded, *That, that Woman who, after the Death of her Husband, Asserted her self to be with Child, should give Notice twice a Month to them, to whom this matter did appertain, viz.* The next Heirs at Law; that satisfaction might be given them, &c. As in the Answer p. 13. From hence, Sir, I think you may plainly discern the difficulty of this Answerer. For I appeal to you, and profess I would to all Mankind if the foremention'd Cases ( and yet they are those he refers us to; and I Challenge him to give me any other in Civil Law, any ways relating to supposititious Births ) have any Relation to that of the Prince of *Wales*. The first of these Cases, being between a Husband and his Wife after a Divorce: The second, of the Inheritance and Possession of an Estate, between the Relations of a dead Husband and the Wife, who Asserted her self with Child. But in the Case of the Prince of *Wales*, I think there was no Divorce; neither could there be any dispute of Inheritance in the businest, when his Father, King *James*, was then alive; and consequently no such thing as Succession or Mission in the Possession of the Goods of him who was still living. For the Rule in Civil Law is, *Viventis nulla est hereditas neque successio;* according to the 29. Dig. Tit. 2. L. 19. de Acquirenda vel omittenda hereditate. From all which I infer, That ( supposing the Civil Law, which this Gentleman has been pleased to Quote, were indeed Common Law ( upon which the true State of the Controversie alone depends) and more over in the great Charter of *England* ) that King *James* was not obliged to such a Formality, reithei'r of the Cases abovementioned, in the least, to have him concern'd in them. By the by, I cannot omit wondering, since this Gentleman seems to be so mightily taken ( and I may well enough add so mightily mistaken ) with Civil Law, he did not gratify the World with an Exposition of the Edict of the Emperors *Diocletian* and *Maximinian* Cod. Lib. 9. Tit. 22. L. 10. de partu supposito.

*Cum suppositi partus Crimen Patrui tui Uxori moveas, apud Rectorem Provincie, instituta Accusatio-  
na, id proba.* So that from Civil Law it is not any Cause of suspicion will do the businest, but proof must be made to render it sufficient—— *Affori Incumbit Onus probandi.* And so much for his Civil Law. With this likewise exactly agrees the *Basilicon*; *Ita & Scopioꝝ rū jasice,*

In this busines I have deignedly traved giving you the Exposition of the most Celebrated Civilians Cujacius, Molinæus, and Faber, upon these passages, I have had occasion to quote, because I was loth to have my Letter swell to a Volume. But if any curious Gentleman will take the pains to examine the Learned Works of the foremention'd Civilians, he will find their Expositions agreeable to what I have produced these Laws for.

I shall now briefly observe what I judge material to object to his old Common Law, and then take my leave of him and you for the present. I shall save both the Expence of Time and Paper, if I only desire you to peruse that Chapter in *Braeton*, to which his Margin does refer you; you'll find it chiefly concerns what the Civil Law, I mentioned before, provided for: And as for *Fleta* ( who almost in every thing follows *Braeton*, ) he says, *That supposing the Husband and Wife being Summoned by the King to appear before the Sheriffs, upon Complaint of the next Heir, that they have Forg'd and Suborn'd a supposititious Child.* To use his own Words. *Si potentes videbantur esse Parentes, ad Prolem suscitandam pro bærede judicabitur nisi querens docere possit Contrarium.* *That if the Parents be thought able to get Children ( their Child ) shall be adjudged Heir, except the Plaintiff can prove the contrary.* Take Notice here what both *Braeton* and *Fleta* say, *That this Writ is to be issued out by the King, &c.* Therefore granting this were now true Law ( which I deny ) yet I cannot perceive how it would reach the King. For who is so mad to suppose the King would issue out a Writ to his Officer, for the Examining the Queen, his Wife, with whose Issue he himself is well satisfied. His friend *Braeton* would have told him according to his Old Law, *That if the King Rule indeed contrary to the Laws of the Land; that all that Subjects ought to do in the matter is to have recourse to supplication ( to use his Words,) Cum Breve non currat contra ipsum.* ) That he would correct his Error, which ( says he ) if he refuses and denies to do, 'tis altogether sufficient punishment for him, That he expect God a Revenger. For ( as he goes on ) no Man may presume to call his Actions in Question, much less rise up against his Act. *Braeton lib. 2. cap. 8. de acquirendo rerum Dominio, fol. 5.*

To end all, I'll transcribe you what our Oracle of the Law of England says in this matter. Well, without difficulty, suppose, I mean my Lord Cook.

" For the Benefit and Safety of Right Heirs *contra partus suppositos*, the Law hath provided Regist. Remedy by the Writ *de Ventre Inspectando*, whereof the Rule in the Register is this. Nota. Si 227.  
" quis habens Hæreditatem duxerit aliquam in Uxorem, & postea meriatur ille sine Hærede de Corpore suo Bracton.  
" Execute per quam Hæreditatis illa Fratri ipsius defuncti descendere desbeat; & Uxor dicit se esse pregnan- 1. 2. f. 69.  
" tem de ipso disimile cum non sit, habeat Frater & Hæres Breve de Ventre inspectando. It seemeth by Britton.  
" Braeton and Fleta, which followed him, that this Writ doth lie ubi Uxor alijus in vita Viri sui f. 165.  
" se pregnantem fecit cura non sit ad Exhæreditationem veri Hæredis, &c. Ad querelam veri Hæredis per c. 14.  
" præcepit Domini Regis, &c. which is to be understood according to the Rule of the Register: whena  
" Man having Lands in Fee-Simple dieth, and his Wife soon after marrieth again, and seigns her  
" self with Child by her former Husband: In this Case, though she be married, the Writ *de*  
" *Ventre Inspectando*, doth lie for the Heir. But if a Man seized of Lands in Fee ( for Example )  
" hath Issue a Daughter, who is Heir Apparent; She in the Life of her Father, cannot have this  
" Writ for divers Causes. First, Because She is not Heir, but Heir Apparent; for, as hath been  
" said, *Nemo est Hæres Viventis*; and this Writ is given to the Heir to whom the Land is descended.  
" And both *Braeton* and *Fleta* say that this Writ lieth *ad querelam veri Hæredi*, which cannot be  
" in the Life of his Ancestors, and herewith agreeth *Britton* and the Register. Secondly, the ta-  
" king a Husband, in the Case aforesaid, being her own Act, cannot barr the Heir of his lawful  
" Action

"Action once record'd in him. Thirdly, the Law doth not give the Heir Apparent any Writ; for  
"tis not certain whether he shall be Heir *Sunt Dens facit Heredes*. Fourthly, the Inconveniences  
"were too great, if Heirs Apparent in the Life of their Ancestors, should have such a Writ to  
"examine and try a Man's lawful Wife, in such sort as the Writ *de Ventre Inspectando* doth appoint;  
"Or if She should be found to be with Child, or suspect; then She must be removed to a Castle,  
"and there safely kept until her Delivery; and so any Man's Wife might be taken from him  
"against the Laws of God and Man. So say my Lord Chief Justice Coke. *Instit. Part. I. lib. I.*  
*cap. I. lib. I. fol. 8.*

You may now see what obliged our Answerer to run to his Civil and Old Common Law, the first being little practised in *England*, and neither that nor Old Common Law understood, but by the most eminent Professors. But for the modern Exposition of Laws, he supposed we were a little better vered in. I hope some of our able Lawyers will take care to vindicate the Honour of their Profession, and not suffer it to be thus abused by crafty People, to insinuate Falshood into, and poison the minds of the Ignorant and Unwary. For my own part, what I have here said, is just what my Leisure would suffer me hastily to set down, and therefore wants those Ornaments both of Method and Elegance I could wish it cloathed with; however, considering it an Epistle of one Friend to another, it carries, I hope, its Pardon along with it. Before I take my Farewel, I cannot omit saying somewhat to the grand popular Objection generally urged, *That it is not expected that the Birth of the Prince of Wales be proved Spurious, since a Negative will not admit of Proof.* To which I answer, That the asserting his Highness, the Prince of Wales not to be K. J.'s Son is an Affirmative. For suppose I assert *Titius* not to be the Son of *Caius*, I affirm him to be the Son of Some-body else: So till the Prince of *Wales* be proved to be the Son of Some-body else than of K. J.—s, I should do a very great Injury to Equity and Common Justice (since his Father has own'd him) should I pronounce him a Bastard. Beside, the Matter never came to Litigation or Dispute; and to hang People before we judge 'em, has ever, I think, been deem'd and look'd upon as too severe and unjust. We ought, in an Affair of such Moment, to be very wary and cautious how we proceed; since the Example, I fear, may be of direful and pernicious Consequence. Encouraging you still to be stedfast in the Truth, I take my Leave of you with these excellent Lines of *Horace*,

*Justum & tenacem propositi Virum*  
*Non Circum ardor prava Jubentium;*      *Non vulnus instantis Tyranni,*  
*Mente quavis solida.*

I am, Deareſt SIR,

April 5. 1691.

Your moſt Faithful and Affectionate Friend

And Humble Servant.

